A recent lecture on the importance of consistency in international law has been met with accusations of hypocrisy. The argument, which utilized a 3,000-year-old historical narrative to justify Israel’s modern statehood, has been criticized for its selective application of international norms.
Proponents of the lecture’s thesis point to the historical connection between the land of Israel and the Jewish people, drawing parallels between ancient kingdoms and modern-day claims of sovereignty. However, this argument falls flat when juxtaposed with the speaker’s dismissal of 400 years of Ottoman governance and continuous Turkish presence in Cyprus. This double standard raises questions about the sincerity of the lecture’s message.
Cyprus, a sovereign nation with its own distinct history and culture, is often overlooked in discussions of international law. However, the island’s complex history bears relevance to the debate surrounding Israeli statehood. In 1974, Turkey intervened in Cyprus under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, an international agreement signed by the UK, Greece, and Cyprus. This intervention was meant to protect the native Turkish Cypriot population from ethnic cleansing after a Greek-led military coup.
In stark contrast, Israel’s expansion of settlements in the West Bank has been repeatedly condemned by the UN Security Council. These settlements are widely regarded as illegal under international law, and are seen as a major impediment to the pursuit of a negotiated peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
Turkish intervention in Cyprus, often misrepresented as a land-grab, was in fact an act of guarantor powers protecting their native population. The Turkish Cypriot community remains in control of their ancestral lands, and the international community has recognized Northern Cyprus as a sovereign entity within the United Nations.
The inconsistency in the lecture’s argument raises important questions about the application of international law. If a guarantor power protects its native population under an international treaty, is this fundamentally different from a decade-spanning military occupation building illegal settlements? The answer, of course, is yes.
In concluding, one cannot help but be struck by the selective application of international norms in the lecture’s argument. If we are to have a genuine conversation about consistency in international law, we must be willing to confront the complexities of history and the nuances of international relations. Anything less would be a disservice to the very principles we claim to uphold.
